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Abstract 
 
The allocation of time is a crucial decision that influences many aspects of 
household welfare. According to standard theory it depends on the potential wage 
rate of spouses relative to their domestic productivity. A major problem, however, 
is that individual productivities are not observed. As a consequence, an important 
source of difference in household living standards alongside with heterogeneity in 
preferences and wage rates, cannot be accounted for.  
This paper presents a new methodology to estimate individual domestic 
productivity based on the informational content of a standard time use survey, with 
time inputs observable but domestic output immeasurable. It provides empirical 
evidence based on a sample of French two-earner couples.  
As a test of the empirical validity of this approach, the paper shows that the 
estimate of female domestic productivity is a significant variable in explaining the 
overall intra-household distribution of resources. 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: D13, J22 
Key words: Home production, time- use, collective models. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This work was supported in part by the European Community's Human Potential 
Programme under contract HPRN-CT-2002-00235 [AGE]. We thank M. Browning, P. A. 
Chiappori, D. Del Boca, C. Flinn, T. Jappelli, V. Lechene and participants at CAM 
workshop on the Economics of the Family in Copenhagen, CHILD workshop in Verona, 
ESPE conference in Paris and seminars at the University of Salerno, Maynooth University 
Dublin, New York University, the University of Alicante for helpful comments. 
 
                                                 
∗ World Bank, Washington and PSE, Paris 
# University of Bari, CHILD and CSEF; e-mail address: mc.chiuri@dse.uniba.it  1. Introduction  
 
The allocation of time is a crucial decision that influences many aspects of 
household welfare. This is true, in particular, of the allocation of household members’ 
time among market and domestic activities. Although on average in western countries, 
women devote more than half of their working time to domestic production, large 
variations are typically observed along the income scale. Women tend to spend more 
time in the labour market in the upper end of the distribution of ‘full-time’ income, 
whereas they devote more time to basic domestic activities in the lower end.  
Although the role plaid by domestic production has been fully recognised by 
economic theory since the seminal paper of Becker (1965), nevertheless, the empirical 
literature in this field is still little developed. Empirical analysis of household time 
allocation is usually limited to the choice between paid ‘working time’ and ‘leisure’, 
combining in the latter both true leisure and time spent by household members in 
domestic production. This gap appears to be due to the lack of detailed information on 
the use of time by each household. Yet, the same gap can now be filled with the 
increasing availability of time use surveys in several countries.  
The difficulty is not exclusively confined to the issue of time inputs being 
observable. Data on outputs and on the relative price of domestically produced goods 
with respect to market goods is equally crucial to understand time allocation. As far as 
the latter is concerned, a key assumption in theoretical models is whether domestic 
goods are substitute for market goods
1. If they are imperfectly so, which is the 
assumption made in the Becker model, the price of domestic good is endogenous and 
varies in some unobservable way across households. In effect, this case has been 
criticized by Pollak and Wachter (1975) who argued that the price may even vary for 
each household by the consumption bundle chosen; the only exception is the 
assumption of constant returns to scale in domestic production. Yet, such assumption 
seems restrictive.  
The alternative case, instead, with domestic production substitute for market 
goods is less restrictive as the price for domestic goods is exogenously fixed at the 
market level. Farm-households are the most appropriate example, as they produce and 
sell on the market. (Singh, Squire and Strauss, 1986 were the first to consider it). The 
                                                 
1 See Apps (2003) for a complete discussion on this issue. 
 1same framework is applicable to households in advanced economies as nearly every 
domestic activity could be substituted with a market good of a similar quality. 
Deciding on what is the most justified assumption on the substitutability between 
domestic and market goods, requires the knowledge of not only time inputs into 
domestic production but also outputs. Outputs are rarely observed though
2, so that there 
will remain for some time something arbitrary in the assumptions unless market and 
domestic good substitutability is considered.  
In this paper we show that under the assumption of perfect substitutability, it is 
possible to recover, from time use data and market earning rates, information on 
individual domestic productivities, and of course total domestic output. To our 
knowledge this is the first paper providing some indirect estimate of domestic 
productivities.  
The availability of a measure of domestic productivity allows to more detailed 
tests about intra household decision making and in particular the allocation of working 
time between domestic and market activities and across spouses.  
The idea that this allocation depends on individual bargaining power within a 
household is not new. It was already explored by Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori 
(1997) within the framework of the so-called ‘collective’ – or Pareto-efficient- intra-
household model of time allocation. Under this assumption, and in the absence of 
consumption externalities across spouses, decision about the time allocation between 
domestic and market activities may be decentralized. Each spouse makes his/her choice 
on the basis of the prices he/she faces and a ‘sharing rule’ of full-time income within the 
household, that reflects relative bargaining powers.   
Chiappori (1997) theoretically shows that if domestic goods are substitute for 
market goods, then it is possible to retrieve from the observation of time use data the 
production function of domestic goods up to a multiplicative constant, and the intra-
household sharing rule up to an additive constant
3.  
In addition to providing indirect estimates of domestic productivities this paper 
offers a test for some of the hypotheses derived from the collective model of intra-
                                                 
2   Even when both time use and household consumption levels are observable, Browning and Gortz 
(2005), show that combining the two types of information leads to ever difficulties  
3   The results holds true with a non increasing return to scale production function (see Rapoport, Sofer 
and Solaz, 2003). 
 2household allocation of consumption, leisure, market and domestic working time among 
households.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical 
framework and presents the assumptions necessary for the identification of  domestic 
productivity. In Section 3 a functional form is chosen for home production that permits 
estimating domestic productivities. The main characteristics of the sample of French 
households are reported in Section 4. Results of the indirect estimation procedure of 
women’s productivity are also discussed in that section. Finally, Section 5 presents a 
model for the estimation of intra-household allocation of goods, market and domestic 
time and applies it to the data set, including domestic productivity estimates. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
 
2. The collective model with domestic production 
 
In this paper we consider the basic ‘collective’ model of consumption and leisure 
allocation in presence of domestic production with no public consumption and no 
externality between partners. If domestic and market goods are perfect substitutes, this 
model may be expressed as follows: 
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Individual preferences, Ui, for the male (i=m) and female (i=f) member of the 
household are defined over private consumption of a composite good  , which 
includes both market and domestic goods, and pure leisure  . Individual leisure can be 
obtained from the time constraint in the last equation of (1) where time for home 
production is   and labour market time  , total time available being  .. Savings are 
ignored so that income and consumption coincides. The budget constraint then defines 
total household consumption as the sum of aggregate non-labour income, y, market 
labour incomes, w
i C
i l
i t i L i T
iLi, where wi stands for the wage rate of individual i,, and the market 
 3value of total home production. The latter is generated separately
4 by both spouses 
according to the production functions hi( ), i = m, f. The price of the composite market 
good   and its domestic substitutes is normalised to unity. Production functions are 
increasing in two individual specific arguments, i.e. the individual time inputs   and 
individual domestic productivity 
i C
i t
i π . Moreover, it will be reasonably assumed that the 
marginal product of labour in domestic production is decreasing with time ti.  
In (1) θ  is a weighting factor assigned to individual preferences with a value in 
the closed interval [0,1]. Two alternative assumptions can be made on θ . If it is a 
constant term, independent of individual characteristics, then problem (1) can be 
inserted in the traditional “unitary” approach to household decision modelling. A more 
general framework is provided by the “collective” view
5, where θ  is a function of 
exogenous individual and household attributes, such as non labour income y and 
distributional factors including the relative value of individual wage rates  . Denoting 
non-wage distributional factors by κ , the weighing factor θ can be written as a function 
i w
( ) κ , , , f m w w y θ .  
Solving out problem (1) proves that optimal decisions over time use depends on 
preferences, technology in the domestic production activity, wage rate and non-labour 
income. A simpler form can be obtained from using the recursivity property coming 
from the full substitutability of market and domestic goods –i.e. the separability of the 
budget constraint with respect to ti, i =m, f. In effect, problem (1) can be solved in two-
stages. Defining  i i i t L L + =
~
 as total labour time, (1) can be re-written as follows: 
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where Pi* and ti* are the solution to the profit maximization problem: 
                                                 
4 We exclude cases of joint production, i.e. of production technologies that depends in a non-separable 
way on both partner time inputs.  
5 See Bourguignon and Chiappori (1992), Browning and Chiappori (1998) or Browning, Bourguignon 
and Chiappori (2006)  
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A first result of this paper is the indirect estimation of individual productivity 
from the observation of time use. This result is derived from the second stage 
maximization problem (3). The first order condition of that problem writes:  
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Without very much loss of generality it can be assumed that both partners always do 
some work at home, whatever wage they can obtain on the labour market. Assuming 
decreasing returns to domestic time, this is equivalent to assuming that 
() ∞ → ∂ ∂ i i i t h / , 0 π .  Then, the optimal domestic time of member i is given by the 
second part of condition (4). A graphical representation of that condition and the 
determination is given in Figure 1.  
Denote   as the first derivative of h with respect to  . Under the assumption of 
decreasing marginal returns, the maximization problem (3) has a unique solution, 
. Reasonably assuming that the marginal product of domestic time is increasing 
everywhere with productivity, the second part of condition (4) can be inverted with 
respect to 
it h i t
0
* > i t
i π . Denoting   the inverse of the marginal product of domestic 
labour with respect to productivity, it comes then that:  
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 5Figure 1 Optimal decision over domestic labour time when the recursivity property 
holds. 
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In other words, under the assumption that the marginal product of labour is positive, 
infinite at zero, decreasing with respect to labour but increasing with respect to 
productivity, domestic productivity may be recovered from the observation of labour 
time and the wage rate.  
The recursivity property, associated with the perfect substitutability of domestic 
and market goods, insures that this property is independent of the intra-household 
allocation of total labour time and consumption. The latter can then be obtained from 
the first stage maximization in (2) with : 
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3. Econometric procedure for the identification of individual domestic productivity  
 
In what follows, we use the following specification of the domestic production function 
for member i of household j: 
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In that specification, ai may be interpreted as the mean productivity of domestic labour 
for members of type i and  ij π  as an idiosyncratic contribution to domestic production 
by member i in the household j. The coefficient  i γ  permits the concavity of domestic 
production.  
 
By solving problem (3) under the requirement that the domestic production is of 
type (6), it is possible to find that the first order condition (FOC) leading to a positive 
time spent in domestic production, whenever he/she also works, is: 
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i.e. the condition that equalises individual’s marginal domestic productivity (in 
monetary value) to his/her wage rate. According to the efficient condition (7), allocating 
working time to home production for a given level of labour market time, would depend 
on both individual domestic productivity and the salary level.  
As already shown in Section 2, condition (7) can be solved out to find the optimal 
level of time   assigned by each individual in a couple to home production, that is:  ij t
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Substituting solution (8) into (3), we find that the optimal domestic production 
level is: 
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 7As far as the identification of individual domestic productivity is concerned, from 
condition (7) we know that  ij π  could be in principle identified from the observed 
individual wage rate, when  . Alternatively, for  ,  0 = ij t 0 > ij t ij π  can still be retrieved 
after introducing some heterogeneity in the model. In particular, the following steps 
show how the home production function can be estimated through the first order 
condition (8) when heterogeneity is imposed on the slope coefficient   and on the 
intercept term 
i a
ij π .  
Introduce heterogeneity in   by rewriting this coefficient as:  i a
( ) ij i i a a ε + = 1       ( 1 0 )  
where  ij ε  is distributed as  ( ε ) σ , 0 N . Then, the hour equation rewrites as: 
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Considering that the second term may be rather small and taking first order 
approximations, the home production labour supply may be re-written as : 
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Let us now introduce observed heterogeneity in  ij B : 
ij i ij ij X B η β + = '       ( 1 2 )  
where  ij η  is an error term, orthogonal to  ij ε , which follows  ( ) η σ , 0 N  distribution and 
which captures also some measurement errors. Due to the recursivity property discussed 
in Section 2, condition (12) allows us to instrument  ij π  on a vector of individual   
specific characteristics  .  ij X
Finally, putting (11) and (12) together (ignoring the product of residual terms 
εij·ηij), the structural form for individual domestic production time becomes: 
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 8Model (13) is non -linear in  i γ . It also exhibits heteroskedasticity with some restrictions 
linking the expected value of   and the standard deviation of the error terms. 
Therefore, equation (13) could be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques 
(ML). The derivation of the log likelihood function is reported in Appendix 1.  
ij t
Using definition (12), the fitted value of  ij π  will be given by the condition: 
) ˆ ' ( ˆ ˆ i ij i ij X a β π ⋅ =       ( 1 4 ) .  
 
 
 
. 4. Measuring individual domestic productivity for a sample of French households 
 
 
The data-set used in this study is the INSEE (1999) survey Enquête Emploi Du 
Temps 1998-99, which is the broadest experiment ever conducted in France of data 
collection of household time use. It includes information on main demographic 
characteristics, labour supply, incomes and use of time for a sample of 8,186 French 
households (20,370 individuals). Data on the use of time were collected for household 
members 15 years old or older (15,441 individuals in 7,949 households); they received 
and filled a booklet reporting information on the use of time in minutes in a weekly day. 
The potential of the survey is clear-cut once it is compared with a previous time use 
survey by INSEE, collected in 1986, which had the limit of providing time use 
information on one member per household, rendering it useless for our study. 
Being interested in analysing couple’s time allocation process, we only consider 
households whose head lives in couple (corresponding to 64.75 percent of the total 
sample). Moreover, we also select those households with head and spouse being 25-60 
years old. As our framework does not raise retirement and unemployment issues, we 
exclude households with couple members being either retired or unemployed; 
moreover, under the assumption that income variables might not be reliable, we do not 
consider families with head or spouse being self-employed.  
To begin with, we disregard use of time on holidays or during the weekend, as 
time use in spare time might be driven by significantly different purposes. Therefore, a 
further selection (2,482 households, about 56 percent of the selected sample) considers 
family members interviewed in working days only. Later on, however, as a sensitivity 
 9analysis, we empirically test whether our approach extends to the allocation of time over 
the weekend. 
Finally, 31 percent of the selected sample reported missing income variables, and 
as a consequence we disregard them. Thus, the final sample of our study has 674 
observations and its main characteristics are reported in Table 1.  
In the survey the description provided for each line of activity is very accurate: it 
contains duration, place and activity type (classified in about 90 codes). Following 
INSEE (2000) we recode the reported activities into six main categories:  
a)  personal time,  
b)  domestic time,  
c)  child care,  
d)  market working time,  
e)  travel time,  
f)  leisure
6. 
                                                 
6   In particular, personal time includes sleeping, self-care, private activities or eating; home-production 
time adds up minutes spent in cooking, cleaning, sowing, washing, doing shopping or gardening. The 
category of child care includes time spent playing with children whereas market working time 
comprises paid work also if done at home, training, learning and time breaks. Leisure considers 
various types of entertainment as sports, reading, cinema, listening music, watching TV, relaxing, and 
social activities as voluntary work, religious practices and telephone conversations. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for couples  
 no. mean std.  dev.
(1) Household  Characteristics 
Household without children (a) 166 0.25
Number of children: (a)  508 2.00 1.02
Geographical area: 
North 674 0.08
East 674 0.12
Central-east 674 0.10
Centre 674 0.24
Parisian Region 674 0.13
West 674 0.18
South-west 674 0.10
Mediterranean 674 0.10
Home- ownership status   674 0.63
Total weekly unearned income  (b) (c) 674 79.99 185.69
 
(2) Men Characteristics 
Age 674 42.34 9.10
Education:                               Primary school 674 0.25
Secondary school 674 0.13
Univ. and post-grad. Degrees 674 0.27
Employment Characteristics:     Participation 674 0.91
Weekly contract hours of work  612 37.95 4.89
Net hourly wage  (b) 612 10.03 6.35
(2) Women Characteristics 
Age 674 39.99 8.73
Education:                               Primary school 674 0.27
Secondary school 674 0.16
Univ. and post-grad. Degrees 674 0.28
Employment Characteristics:     Participation 674 0.64
Weekly contract hours of work  432 33.34 9.25
Net hourly wage  (b) 432 8.31 4.89
Note: (a) the number of positive observations only is reported. 
(b) Nominal variables in Euro 
(c) Unearned income is a derived variable from total household income net of couple’s labor 
income. 
  
Table 2 contains some descriptive statistics on the percentage of time devoted to 
each activity in a day by each spouse. Men devote most of their working time on the 
job, whereas time is almost equally shared between paid and unpaid work for women. 
Another interesting picture concerning time use comes out of Table 3 which 
contains the statistically significant correlation matrix across spouse activities. As we 
could expect, there is a high complementarity in working time between spouses, proven 
by a positive correlation (0.2) between their market working time and by a negative 
 11correlation between individual leisure and partner’s working time. Similarly individual 
leisure is also positively correlated with the spouse one. There is instead no evidence of 
joint domestic production (in line with our assumption of separability in the production 
function), rather women time for home production is positively correlated with men’s 
leisure. 
 
Table 2 Couple’s time use  
  mean std. dev.
 
Men daily time use (in percent) 
Duration of personal time  0.44 0.08
Duration of market working time  0.31 0.12
Duration of home production time  0.06 0.07
Duration of leisure  0.13 0.09
Duration of travel time  0.05 0.04
Duration of child care  0.01 0.02
Women daily time use (in percent) 
Duration of personal time   0.43 0.07
Duration of market working time   0.20 0.16
Duration of home production time   0.19 0.12
Duration of leisure   0.11 0.08
Duration of travel time   0.04 0.04
Duration of child care  0.03 0.06
Note: Each distribution refers to the selected sample of 674 households.  
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Table 3 Correlation indexes across spouses’ use of time 
MEN 
WOMEN 
Market working 
time  
Home 
production time 
Leisure 
Market working time  0.197 *  -  -0.223 * 
Home production time  - -  0.091 
Leisure  -0.205 *  -  0.350 * 
Note: Only correlation indexes significant at the 95% level are reported  
* Significant at the 99% level. 
 
 
Figure 2 describes the distribution of working (market and non market) activities 
(in minutes) for the sample of households with both spouses participating to the labour 
market. More than half of the sample of men reports zero time or less than an hour per 
day time devoted to domestic production. As expected individual market working time 
in both cases peaks at 8 hours, the so-called “contract hours”. 
Finally, consider that market working time and home production of each partner 
are negatively correlated (-0.8 for women and -0.5 for men). 
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Figure 2 Intra household allocation of time – Sample of two-earner households  
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Following the theoretical analysis described in Sections 2 and 3 we carry out the 
estimation of individual domestic productivity on the sample of individuals that work 
on the labor market and produce domestic goods by means of a two step procedure, 
which allows to correct for sample selection bias. 
Our empirical evidence shows that men and women view the problem of time 
allocation from different perspectives. Women, given their domestic technology, their 
preferences for consumption and leisure and share of income, optimally allocate their 
working time between the labour market and domestic good production. Men instead 
ultimately consider as an option domestic production. Such underlining evidence will 
drive our research strategy to estimate individual domestic productivities, as it will 
follow two distinct directions. 
 14In particular, in order to estimate women domestic productivity we introduce a 
latent variable   capturing, in reduced form, the joint female participation decision to 
the labor market and to domestic production.   is defined as a linear function of: 
*
fj I
*
fj I
( ) fj j fj X Y f I ,
* =  with  j=1,…n     ( 1 5 )  
where the vector Xfj contains a set of individual characteristics (age, education etc.) 
whereas Yj is a vector of household characteristics. 
We also construct a dichotomous variable   such that   and 
; this indicates the alternative chosen. From Heckman (1979), we 
know that the full log-likelihood function of our model can be estimated in two-steps, 
i.e. with: 
fj I 0 1
* ≥ ⇔ = fj fj I I
0 0
* < ⇔ = fj fj I I
a.  a preliminary estimation of a probit equation for the joint decision to 
participate to the labor market and spend a positive amount of time for 
domestic production, in reduced form; 
b.  the estimation of women time devoted to home production using the 
structural form (13) and controlling for selection bias involved in the 
simultaneous choice of working and producing domestic goods by including 
the inverse of the Mill’s ratio  fj λ , obtained from the first stage estimation. 
 
Empirical estimates of the first step are presented in Table 4. Among the 
household characteristics included in the regression, the joint decision is mainly 
affected by a non linear function of age; also the higher is household non labor income 
the less likely the woman combines paid work with the domestic one. Instead a higher 
investment in education provides strong incentives for a woman to work more. Finally, 
playing the role of a demand factor for home production as an exclusive activity, the 
number of children has a discouraging impact, with an additional effect when they are 
0-3 years old. 
 
 
 15Table 4 The probability for a woman jointly participating to labor market and 
producing domestic goods  
Variables  
Woman’s age  0.422   (0.077) *** 
Woman’s age 
2 -0.005   (0.001) *** 
Non labor income  -0.002   (0.000) *** 
Man’s Wage  -0.008   (0.010)  
Woman Educational Dummies: Bac technique  0.606   (0.274) ** 
                                                   Bac +2   0.429   (0.197) ** 
Univ. and post-grad. degree  0.544   (0.220) *** 
Number of children  -0.396   (0.062) *** 
No. of children 0-3 years old  -0.499   (0.158) *** 
Other adult  0.291   (0.385)  
City dummy: Paris  0.091   (0.168)  
Internet service at home  0.592   (0.263) ** 
Constant   -6.746   (1.466) *** 
Obs.   612   
Pseudo 
2 R =0.22 
(***:  ; **: 00 ;  *: 00 p ≤ 00 1 . 1 00 5 .. <≤ p 5 01 0 .. < ≤ p ) 
Note: In the table results of a probit estimation and standard errors in brackets. Reference 
categories for categorical variables: women with a degree CAP/BEP or Bac general and not 
living in the capital.  
 16Results from the second step, i.e. the estimation of women time devoted to home 
production, are reported in Table 5. In support of the non-linear function of wage, 
derived from the marginal condition (7), both the estimated coefficients for  f A  and  f γ  
are consistent with a decreasing return to scale production function and satisfy the 
negative relation between the time devoted to domestic production and the wage rate.  
 
Table 5 Estimation of women time for domestic production 
Variables 
f A   0.616 (0.189) ***
f γ   0.389   (0.103) ***
fj B  :  Constant  -0.148 (0.064) **
Woman age  0.010 (0.003) ***
    Woman age
2 -0.000 (0.000) **
CAP/BEP school  -0.018 (0.007) ***
Bac technique  0.003 (0.012)
Bac general   -0.034 (0.011) ***
fj λ  
0.016 (0.011)
ε σ  
0.359 (0.142) ***
η σ  
0.000   (0.045)
Obs. 401
  L log =559.82 
Note: in the table results by ML estimation corrected for female 
participation to labor market and domestic production. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Reference category for categorical variables: Bac+2 and 
University and postgraduate degree.    
 
 
The intercept term  f fj a π  is instrumented with a polynomial function of age and three 
educational dummies. Recall that a result highlighted in Section 2 is that optimal time 
devoted to home production, when it is also efficient to offer paid work, is affected by 
individual characteristics only; this property is valid regardless of the framework 
 17adopted (unitary or collective). We find that women domestic productivity increases 
with age but at a decreasing rate, whereas lower education associates with lower 
domestic productivity, provided that the reference categories are higher degrees of 
schooling. A common negative constant term indicates a lower bound, i.e. a fixed cost, 
above which a positive value for domestic production can be obtained. 
Given the estimation of the error term  fj ε , each parameter of the production 
function can be derived, as already stated in Section 3 and their statistics are reported in 
Table 6.  
 
 
Table 6 Estimated coefficients of the woman domestic production function 
Variable Mean  Std  dev Min Max
f a   22.613 8.536 6.877 51.508
f π   1.485 0.463 -0.053 2.136
f γ   0.389   0.000 0.389   0.389  
 
 
We also investigate whether the estimated values for  fj π  significantly differ 
from the female wage rates: in particular, as a further check, we regress the latter on the 
same regressors used as instruments for  fj π  and we find a high discrepancy in their 
distribution and a relatively low correlation coefficient (0.36).  
As a sensitivity analysis, we also consider a more general model. In particular, 
instead of selecting only the sample of couples interviewed in working days, we also 
examine whether our model would determine how women in couple allocate their time 
between market work and home production during a whole week (weekend included).   
Thus, let   be the total hours of domestic production determined by the model, 
that is after equalizing the marginal product of hours of work with the wage rate. 
Consider two distinct values for  , depending on the day of the interview. Let then   
be hours of work for those people observed during a weekday and   hours of work of 
people observed during the weekend.  
fj t
fj t
wd
fj t
we
fj t
 18Provided that   and  fj
wd
fj t t ⋅ =ψ ( ) fj
we
fj t t ⋅ − = ψ 1 , with 0<ψ<1, then a 
generalization of the model described in (13) - when both samples are considered -
would imply the following for observed hours,  :  
o
fj t
( ) ( ) fj fj
o t D t D t
fj ⋅ − ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ = 1 1 ψ ψ    with  j=0,…,n   (16) 
where D is a dummy for being observed on a week-day and   is defined in (13).  fj t
If a model of optimal week-time allocation as in (16) were a better 
representation for the household decision process, we would expect that women with a 
high salary should do less home production on week-ends, when they may have less 
constraint on their time.  
However, results obtained estimating equation (16) by ML on a sample of 778 
observations (401 couples interviewed on a week day and 377 over the weekend) were 
largely unsatisfactory. A plausible explanation is that, due to the constraints set by the 
market, a worker with a high wage will do more paid work during the week– i.e. when 
the market is ‘open’- and postpone more domestic work in the week-end. In other 
words, the model examined as first seems more appropriate, as it is derived under the 
assumption that the optimal allocation of time between paid and unpaid work is valid 
only on week-days, since the time to be spent on home production during week-ends 
cannot be determined by the wage rate; rather it should result from some optimal 
allocation between pure leisure and home production. Thus we found that the 
dichotomy between production and consumption examined in this study for working 
women breaks down during the weekend. 
On the basis of such evidence, we can conclude that an additional hour of 
domestic production is traded with market time, for a constant leisure, only on 
weekdays as on average women cannot go to work on week-ends and cannot postpone 
all domestic consumption to week-ends either. Overall, we consider this result as further 
evidence supporting our model of efficient allocation between home production and 
market working time during a week, but excluding the weekend.  
Before turning to the labor supply estimation, we briefly discuss the lack of 
evidence found for men domestic production. Several attempts made with various 
sophisticated econometric specifications (as a non linear tobit model) were unable to 
provide convincing results. As a consequence we are not in the position to estimate men 
 19domestic productivity  mj π ; thus we can conclude that time devoted to home production 
by men is only randomly chosen after their working time has been fixed by contract and 
they fall in the first extreme case of equation (8) with  0 ≤ m a . In what follows we 
consider  mj π  as a random component in the production function and in the household 
system of labour supply. 
 
  
 
5. Individual domestic productivity and intra-household income distribution  
 
A further aim of the paper is the analysis of the intra-household allocation of 
total working time. In particular, under the assumption of egoistic or caring preferences, 
problem (2) is equivalent to: 
( )
i i i i
i i i
l C
L w C t s
L T C U
i i
φ + ≤
−
~
. .
~
, max
,    ( i=m, f)  (17) 
where  i φ  is member i share of total income, including domestic production. In other 
words, in the literature of collective household models  i φ  is the so-called “income 
sharing rule” and in order for individual budget constraints to meet the total household 
income, the condition  y P y i f m = + = + * φ φ  has to hold.  
The collective framework imposes certain further restrictions on the system of 
total labor supply, as it will be of the following type: 
( ) ( )
() () d d
d d
, , , , , , ,
~ ~
, , , , , , ,
~ ~
f m f m m f
f
f
f m f m m m m m
y w w y w L L
y w w w L L
π π φ
π π φ
− =
=
    (18). 
Taken d as a vector of demographic variables affecting both individual preferences and 
the income share  i φ , we can show how the particular structure of system (18) imposes 
testable restrictions on the labor supply behavior and allows to recover the individual 
income sharing rule  m φ  up to an additive function of d, if at least one distribution factor 
can be observed. In particular, note that an important testable restriction has to do with 
the role here plaid by domestic productivities. In principle, individual domestic 
productivity affects a collective system of household total labor supply through two 
channels:  
 20(i)  the total non labor income  y ,  
(ii)  the weighing factor θ (or, equivalently the income share  i φ ).  
In a standard unitary model instead, domestic productivities should have only 
affected total labor supply through unearned income only, which, in principle, already 
provides a new test of the unitary versus the collective model. 
However, we already noted that, due to the functional form chosen,   in (9) is 
independent of the intercept 
∗
i P
i π  in the individual optimal domestic production level. In 
other words, we find that for internal solutions only, the requirement of efficiency in 
home production implies that the system of total labor time (18) depends on the 
individual domestic productivity parameter  i π  only through  () ⋅ m φ , thus fully satisfying 
the definition for a distributional factor already provided by the literature on collective 
models. 
Although testing for the relevance of individual domestic productivity in the 
household labor supply might already provide a preliminary evidence against the 
traditional unitary model, it is yet not sufficient as a test for the collective model. As 
shown in CFL and other studies, it is the way in which the distribution factor  i π  and the 
spouse’ wage rate do affect the two labour supplies that enables us to test for a general 
collective model of labour supply.  
Following CFL (their Proposition 3), we can derive a set of necessary conditions 
for any pair of ( ) f m L L
~
,
~  to be the solution of problem (17) for a given sharing rule  m φ . 
CFL show that observing one distribution factor and the individual wage rates is 
sufficient to impose a set of testable restrictions for a collective model on a system of 
labour supply and to recover the partials of the sharing rule with respect to total non 
labour income, each individual wage rate and the distribution factors  i π . 
Thus, in order to derive a series of parametric tests, we compare the collective 
approach with an unrestricted system of household labour supplies, in line with the 
testing strategy developed in CFL. However, the novelty here stays in the fact that we 
apply it to a system of total labour supply ( ) f m L L
~
,
~  as the sum of market working time 
and time devoted to domestic activities as solution of problem (3).  
 21In order to provide testable restrictions for the collective model as earlier 
specified, consider the following household labour supply system: 
()
() d
d
' log
log log log log log
~
' log
log log log log log
~
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
9 8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1 0
m m m y w m
y w m w w m y m w m w m m L
f f f y w f
y w f w w f y f w f w f f L
m f f
m m f f m
f
m f f
m m f f m
m
+ + + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + + + + =
+ + + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + + + + =
π π
π π   
  (19) 
 
System (19) has a semi-log functional form, and compared to the one used by CFL 
it allows more interactions in the variables. We call it unrestricted because no cross-
equation restrictions are imposed; however, it does provide the nesting framework to 
test for a collective model
7. 
Following CFL, we retrieve the necessary conditions for system (19) to be derived 
from a collective framework and we obtain three equality restrictions:  
8
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
4
4
m
f
m
f
m
f
m
f
m
f
= = = =       ( 2 0 )  
Note that if restrictions (20) are satisfied, then the income sharing rule parameters 
can be identified up to a constant, as the partials of  m φ  are respectively: 
                              ( )
∆
+ +
=
∂
∂ f m m w f w f f m
y
log log 6 5 3 5 φ  
∆
=
∂
∂ 5 7 f m
f
m
π
φ         ( 2 1 )  
                            
∆
=
∂
∂ 5 8 f m
m
m
π
φ  
                             ( )
∆
+ +
=
∂
∂
m
f
m
m
w
y m w m m f
w
5 4 1 5 log φ  
                                                 
7 Although we disregard in this paper testing for the unitary model, still the framework could have 
handled it. In particular, if we were in a unitary model, whenever each spouse is favourable to participate 
to the labor market and to produce domestic goods, the household labor supply system (including both 
market and non-market working time), satisfies two sets of restrictions; they are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a household utility function to be maximised, subject to a household budget 
constraint: 
a)  the Slutsky matrix must be symmetric and positive semi-definite; 
b)  a further set of condition is due to the irrelevance of individual domestic productivities in the 
decision process. 
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where  . Integrating the four differential equations system in (21) we can 
obtain the income sharing rule equation: 
3 5 3 5 m f f m − = ∆
[
] τ
π π φ
+ + +
+ + + + + +
∆
=
f m f
m m f f m m
w w f m y w f m
y w f m f m f m w f m w f m y f m
log log log
log log log
1
5 4 5 6
5 5 5 8 5 7 2 5 5 1 3 5
v
v v
 
  (22) 
in (22) τ is an additive function of ( ) d . 
Finally, note that the system of total labour supply associated with a collective 
setting is:  
() 3 2 1
3 2 1
log
~
log
~
β φ β β
α φ α α
+ − + =
+ + =
m f f
m m m
y w L
w L
     ( 2 3 ) .  
 
where  () 5 5 1 5 1 1 / m m f f m − = α ;  7 2 / m ∆ = α ; ( ) 5 5 2 5 2 1 / f m f f m − = β ;  5 2 / f ∆ − = β .  
 
In what follows we present the estimation results of the household labor supply, 
using as measure of working time the sum of market labour time and time devoted to 
domestic production.  
A well-known drawback of market labour supply estimations, especially with 
European survey data, is that due to the rationing imposed by labour contracts, they 
usually do not seem to respond significantly to wages and income. This is particularly 
relevant for men labour supply (see Pencavel, 1986 for a survey). A preliminary 
empirical exercise highlighted that the quality of our estimations could remarkably 
improve when moving from market labour time to total labour supply, above all with 
men working hours, since with the former measure we found a very low significance 
level, as their market working time seems rigidly fixed at a constant level. 
Under such premises, we estimate the household total labour supply by full 
information maximum likelihood (FIML). It provides efficient estimates of the 
parameters of the two simultaneous equations, since it can handle both plausible 
correlation between the error terms in the male and female labour supply and 
heteroskedasticity in the errors in an unknown form. 
 23Another relevant consideration is that wage rates, and non-labour income, 
entering in the household labour supply system, are not exogenous to hours of work.
8 In 
order to overcome the potential endogenity problem, all variables are accurately 
instrumented with exogenous socio-demographic variables (individual age and 
educational level, also interacted), number of children with an additional effect when 
they are 0-3 years old, the presence of another adult co-residing, living in the city of 
Paris and an internet link provided in the house
9.  
Following system (19), each labour supply equation also includes personal age 
in an exponential form, educational dummies and the presence of children 0-3 years old. 
Finally, female labour supply is corrected for selection bias, by adding in the labour 
supply equation the inverse of the Mills’ ratio ( )  obtained from a previous 
estimation of her participation to the labour market; we use as extra identifying 
variables for women participation three regional dummies (detecting the household 
residence in the North, West, or Central- East of the country). 
w λ
Table 7 lists coefficients and asymptotic standard errors obtained from the 
estimation of system (19). The husband total labor supply is affected negatively by his 
own wage rate and by a few demographic variables (in particular age, age squared, 
having a child 0-3 years old and higher educational dummies). The significance of the 
female domestic productivity term in the male labor supply equation already provides 
sufficient evidence against the traditional unitary model, as it has been clarified at the 
beginning of this Section. 
Conversely, the woman’s total working hours are affected by unearned income, 
not only directly, but also interacted with family wages, domestic productivity and the 
 terms are both negative but not significant.   w λ
                                                 
8 There are various reasons for considering the two sets of variables as endogenous; in particular, for the 
wage rate, one should consider the so-called “division bias”, since it is a derived variable (yearly after-
tax labor earnings divided by the product of working weeks per year and working hours per week), and 
also the presence of unobservable components (e.g., preferences for work) which might influence both 
wages and hours. Even individual non-labor income could include endogenous components, as, for 
instance, it might well be derived from labor income savings.  
9 Results are available upon request to the authors. Individual wage estimates were not corrected for 
selection bias, as a preliminary investigation did not provide a better fit. 
 24The second column of Table 7 contains the estimates of the collective system of 
total labor supply, i.e. once restrictions (20) are imposed. Overall signs and significance 
level are confirmed, also when the necessary collective restrictions hold. 
The log-likelihood values obtained from the estimation of system (19), 
unrestricted and when the restrictions derived are imposed, are compared in Table 8, 
which reports the derived likelihood ratio statistics. On the basis of the evidence found, 
the parametric restrictions required by the collective model cannot be statistically 
rejected (LR test  =4.685).  () χ 3
2
Empirical results from the estimation of the collective model is completed with 
the computation of the parameters and the asymptotic standard errors (obtained by 
‘delta method’) of the income sharing rule (see Table 9, which contains also the partial 
derivatives in the second column). They imply that an increase in the husband’s wage 
rate tends to reduce substantially his transfer to the wife, as well as an increase in the 
wife’s wage rate, although the effect is smaller. These results suggest that women of our 
sample behaves more altruistically than men. An opposite result is instead found for 
changes in total unearned income: 100 € increase in non labor income will increase the 
wives’ share by about 70 percent. So far, the signs of the income sharing rule 
parameters are consistent with those found by Chiappori Fortin and Lacroix, although 
our results have a higher significance level.  
 
 25 Table 7 The unrestricted vs. the collective model of household total labor supply  
MEN  Unrestricted system  Collective Model 
log   m w ˆ -4.131   (2.615) *  -1.392   (1.241) 
log   f w ˆ -1.600   (2.031)       0.014   (0.628) 
y ˆ   -0.071   (0.124)  -0.071   (0.156) 
log × log   m w ˆ f w ˆ  0.770    (0.841)   -0.061 
log ×  m w ˆ y ˆ     0.006   (0.048)      -0.021   (0.043) 
log ×  f w ˆ y ˆ    0.0277   (0.088)   0.060 
f π ˆ   -0.608   (0.314) **  -0.053 
Man’s age   0.429   (0.139) ***   0.287   (0.127)  ** 
Man’s age 
2 -0.004   (0.001) ***   0.003   (0.002)   ** 
Man education: Bac general   0.736   (0.544)      0.574   (0.516)   
Bac +2    1.258   (0.617)   **   0.866   (0.559) 
Univ. degrees    1.959   (0.915)   **   1.485   (0.875) * 
Child 0-3 years old   0.548   (0.269)   **   0.576   (0.270)  ** 
Constant   9.140   (5.047)   *   6.403   (2.474)  *** 
WOMEN  Unrestricted system  Collective Model 
log   m w ˆ -0.526   (1.806)  -0.481   (1.847) 
log   f w ˆ  0.450   (1.946)   0.499   (1.973) 
y ˆ   -0.314   (0.119) ***  -0.311   (0.120) *** 
log × log   m w ˆ f w ˆ -0.256   (0.770)  -0.271   (0.790) 
log ×  m w ˆ y ˆ    -0.094   (0.046) ***  -0.091   (0.050) * 
log ×  f w ˆ y ˆ    0.268   (0.085) ***   0.263   (0.090) *** 
f π ˆ   -0.076   (0.418)   -0.233   (0.598) 
Woman’s age   0.040   (0.023)*   0.048   (0.030) * 
Woman education: Bac techn.   0.120   (0.366)    0.177   (0.373) 
Bac general   -0.502   (0.412)  -0.629   (0.477) 
Bac +2  -0.019   (0.255)   0.008   (0.262) 
Child 0-3 years old  -0.363   (0.290)  -0.361   (0.292) 
Constant  10.158   (4.308)   **   9.946   (4.340)  ** 
w λ   -0.448   (0.376)  -0.460   (0.376) 
  LogL= -1508.527; ρ=0.31  LogL= -1510.8693; ρ= 0.33 
Note: FIML estimates of two simultaneous equation. Semi-log system of household total labor 
supply: sample of two earner couples (397 obs.). Coefficients without standard error are 
constrained.  
 26Table 8 Likelihood ratio test  
 Unrestricted 
Model 
Collective 
Model
log L  -1508.527 -1510.869 
LR (dof)  -             4.685 (3)
Note: Sample of households with both spouses 
working 
 
The novelty of our approach allows us to measure the effect of female domestic 
productivity on the intra-household allocation of resources. According to our estimates, 
given an average productivity value of 1.485, a family with a one percentage increase in 
female domestic productivity would see men benefiting of 10.21 € increase in his total 
income share. 
 
 
Table 9 Sharing rule estimates  
 Coefficients    Variable ∂ ∂ m φ  
Log   m w ˆ 1421.90  (457.48) ***   333.75  (221.34)†  
log    f w ˆ -189.00   (171.83)   98.48   (120.33) †  
y ˆ    919.53   (367.47)***   -71.97 (103.75)   
f π ˆ    687.53   (318.26) **   687.53 (318.26) ** 
Log × log    m w ˆ f w ˆ  798.06   (342.45) ***  - 
Log ×  m w ˆ y ˆ     269.09   (198.88)  - 
log  ×  f w ˆ y ˆ   -775.90   (337.72) **  - 
Note: Sample of households with both spouses working. Asymptotic standard 
errors, computed by delta method, in brackets. 
† The derivatives are computed with respect to   and  , respectively.  m w ˆ f w ˆ
 
Table 10 allows to compare the uncompensated labor supply elasticities to 
changes in individual wage rates and non-labor income drawn from the unrestricted 
system with those obtained after imposing the collective restrictions. Under the 
collective specification, we obtain a negative uncompensated wage elasticity for the 
husband, showing a dominant income effect, and a small but positive value for wife, 
 27showing a prevailing substitution effect. This finding is consistent with previous 
international evidence on market labour supply (see Pencavel, 1986), although the 
female uncompensated wage elasticity for total labour hours seems less sensitive to the 
wage rate compared also to the value estimated with market labour hours (0.147). 
Moreover we find that the household total labour supplies are complementary, this is 
particularly evident in the female supply. Finally the collective framework detects 
similar elasticities to non-labour income: for both men and women the value is positive 
and rather small. 
 
Table 10 Labor supply elasticities  
  Total labor supply 
 Unrestricted  Model  Collective  Model 
Men    
Log   m w ˆ -0.587  (0.605)  -0.356   (0.276) 
log    f w ˆ  0.035  (0.429)  -0.013   (0.091) 
y ˆ    0.000   (0.018)   0.001   (0.002) 
Women    
Log   m w ˆ -0.263  (0.099)***  -0.259  (0.099) *** 
log    f w ˆ  0.031   (0.097)   0.033  (0.097) 
y ˆ    0.003   (0.002)   0.003  (0.002) 
Note: Sample of households with both spouses working.  
Asymptotic standard errors, computed by delta method, in brackets. 
 
To sum up, the implementation of the likelihood ratio test, the derivation of the 
parameters required by the model, and the estimation of the labour supply elasticities 
are all consistent in highlighting the need for more sophisticated intra-household 
decision models, that take account of the individual domestic productivity as a 
distributional factor in the within household resource allocation process. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we developed a new technique that allows to estimate individual 
domestic productivity when both couple members work on the labor market. 
 28An interesting finding is that domestic productivity is an independent determinant 
of labor allocation even for women who may have equalized their marginal product at 
home and on the market.  
Our work was also devoted to testing whether a collective model of total labor 
supply is a better representation of intra-household decision over working/leisure time. 
According to our estimates, we cannot reject the collective model as above specified. 
We reckon however that our analysis is subject to few limitations and that opens 
up future directions for research. The invalidation of the recursivity property for couples 
with a non working woman limits our identification technique to two earner couples 
only. Finally, the fact that the choice of market working hours is so heavily constrained 
in France might well have introduced noise in the whole exercise. In this respect 
repeating the estimates with survey from countries with a more flexible labour market 
could provide a useful sensitivity measure.  
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 31Appendix 1 
 
In order to write down the log likelihood function, we generalise (15) considering a 
non-linear model with heteroskedasticity, as it follows: 
( ) ( ) j j j j ij X g X k t η δ ε δ + + = , ,  with    j = 1, .., n  and i=m,f (A.1).   
where  δ  is the vector of coefficients and   a vector of variables, including individual 
demographic characteristics X
x
i, and individual wage rate. 
Furthermore, it follows that (A.1) can be written in a more compact form as: 
( ) j j j ij u X k t + = , δ    with    ()⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ + ≈ 2 2 2 , , 0 η ε σ δ σ i i X g N u  
and   being independent across observations.  j u
Onwards, we use the following simplifications in the notation (with j = 1, .., n):  
( ) j j X k k , δ = ;   ( ) j j X g g , δ = ;  ( ) 2 2 2 2 , η ε σ δ σ + ≈ j j X g s  
We are now able to compute the likelihood function of a sample ( ,  ). It comes out 
immediately that the likelihood of an observation is given by : 
ij t j X
( )
⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡ −
−
Π
=
2
2
2 2
1
j
j ij
j
j
s
k t
Exp
s
V       
 
and, for the whole sample, the log likelihood is: 
()() () ( )
2
2
2 log
2
1
log
2
1
2 log
2
, ,
j
j ij
j j j
s
k t
s
n
LogL
−
∑ − ∑ − Π − = η ε σ σ δ  (A.2) 
From expression (A.2) the vector of the gradient of the likelihood derives. 
Finally, the estimation of model (A.2) by ML will provide a full set of estimates, 
including δ  the vector of coefficients and  j ε , which from total residual   will 
be given by the following condition: 
() j j j g u η ε + ⋅ =
() [ ] ij ij ij ij ij u g E ˆ ˆ = + ⋅ = η ε ε ε  
knowing that  [] 0 , = i i Cov η ε . 
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